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Team-Based Incentives in Problem-Solving
Organizations
Jin-Hyuk Kim∗ Nick Vikander†
Abstract
This paper investigates a repeated employment relationship be-
tween a principal and agents who he hires to solve a series of prob-
lems. Each agent works independently, but the principal can choose
to pay a team incentive bonus to all agents if any one of them solves
a problem.
We show that, under relational contracts, there is a range of pa-
rameter values for which the principal prefers team incentives to in-
dividual incentives. Team incentives create a problem of moral haz-
ard, but they can also reduce the principal’s commitment problem by
smoothing bonus payments over time. The latter eﬀect is particularly
strong when problems are diﬃcult to solve. If team size is endoge-
nous, team incentives can increase eﬃciency by allowing the principal
to motivate a greater number of agents. However, in some such cases,
the principal still chooses individual incentives because they allow him
to appropriate more surplus. (JEL J41, M52)
Keywords: team incentives; relational contracts.
1 Introduction
The last few decades have seen an increasing reliance on teams in the work-
place. For instance, Lawler, Mohrman, and Ledford (1995) found that be-
tween 1987 and 1993, the percentage of Fortune 1000 companies using self-
managing work teams increased from 28 to 68 percent. Teams may be used
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because they promote communication, enhance cooperation, or increase pro-
ductivity.
In particular, teams have existed for many years in work organizations
with an overarching goal of solving problems. For example, teams may be
active in research and development, where solving a problem is equivalent
to making a discovery or having a breakthrough idea. This paper aims to
analyze incentive pay in these type of problem-solving teams.
Human resource management consultants often argue that team organi-
zations are not quite eﬀective unless accompanied by genuine team-based
incentive plans, as individual performance pay can undermine team spirit.
Examples of team-based pay include a commission for the sale of real estate
property that is shared among members of a sales force, and a cash bonus for
a product’s development that is given to a team of scientists and engineers.
Real team-based incentives are used in practice (see, e.g., Gross (1995)), and
there is a growing interest in the adoption of team-based pay in various orga-
nizations (see, e.g., Reilly, Phillipson, and Smith (2005) for experience with
team-based pay in the U.K. National Health Service).
Recently, economists have started paying attention to the complementar-
ity between multiple human resource practices, such as team organization
and team-based pay. For instance, Boning, Ichniowski, and Shaw (2007),
using data from U.S. steel mills, found some evidence that problem-solving
teams can increase the eﬀectiveness of group incentive pay plans.1 Due to
the diﬃculty of measuring individual employee contributions, incentive pay
plans in their sample were all group-based. However, there are also cases
where employers can observe individual performance, but choose to reward
workers based on group performance.
This paper investigates the choice between individual and team-based
incentives in a repeated principal-agent framework. The principal has a
sequence of problems that he wants agents to solve, and he can observe
whenever an agent solves a problem. We consider both the case where this
information is veriﬁable in court (formal contracting), and where it is not
(relational contracting).
Under individual incentives, the principal promises each agent a bonus
whenever that agent solves a problem. Under team incentives, the principal
1Similarly, Dunlop and Weil (1996) and Pil and MacDuﬃe (1996) found a high corre-
lation between the percentage of workers in teams and the use of group-based incentives
in the apparel and the auto industries, respectively.
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promises all agents a bonus in any period where a problem is solved, regard-
less of who solves it. The interpretation is that the whole team is rewarded
whenever the team succeeds. One can view these team incentives as a form of
joint, as opposed to relative, performance evaluation, in the speciﬁc context
of problem solving teams.
We restrict our attention to these two types of incentives regimes, even
though an agent’s bonus could in principle depend on the entire proﬁle of
individual outcomes. For instance, the bonus might depend on how many
agents succeed or fail to solve a problem. We feel that the question of how
team incentives compare to individual incentives is worthy of attention in its
own right. These two incentives regimes are both widely used in practice and
the rules specifying when bonuses are paid are straightforward, which may
well help with their implementation. The increased tractability also allows
us to delve further into the issue of team size.
In our setting, each agent who exerts eﬀort solves the problem with a
certain probability. This probability is independent across agents. It is gen-
erally known that production complementarities can make joint performance
evaluation optimal (Itoh 1991), but that is not what we want to focus on.
Rather, we are interested in how team-based pay can aﬀect problems that the
principal may have with credibility, and assuming independence helps isolate
this eﬀect. We also assume that agents are risk neutral, so the principal does
not need team incentives to reduce agents’ exposure to risk.
We assume that agents who do not exert eﬀort never solve a problem, so
there is no issue of moral hazard under individual incentives. Even though the
principal cannot observe eﬀort, each agent knows that he will never receive
a bonus unless he exerts eﬀort. If there are no issues of credibility, then
the principal can oﬀer an individual bonus that is just high enough to make
an agent’s participation constraint bind. Agents will then work, and the
principal will capture all surplus.
Compared with individual incentives, oﬀering team incentives has two
eﬀects. First, team incentives give each agent the opportunity to free ride on
the work of others. An agent knows that he may receive a bonus even if he
does not work, because one of his teammates may solve the problem. Moral
hazard is then an issue, so the principal must oﬀer an expected bonus that is
strictly higher than the cost of eﬀort to convince agents to work. The extent
of the free-rider problem is limited by agents’ ability to monitor each others’
eﬀort, and punish those who shirk with a grim trigger strategy. However,
this type of work norm cannot eliminate the free-rider problem altogether,
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and the principal must share some surplus with agents. This eﬀect of team
incentives reduces ﬁrm proﬁts.
Second, team incentives can allow the principal to smooth bonus pay-
ments over time. Agents may be willing to work for a lower bonus than
under individual incentives, because they expect to receive a bonus more of-
ten. This will be the case as long as agents are suﬃciently patient, so that
mutual monitoring between agents makes free-riding unattractive.
Under formal contracting, the ﬁrm is only concerned with the expected
payment that it must make to agents. The size of the bonus itself does not
matter, since having to pay a smaller bonus more often does not necessar-
ily represent any cost savings for the ﬁrm. That means the only impact of
team incentives is through morale hazard, which decreases proﬁts. The prin-
cipal will therefore always use individual incentives if formal contracts are
available.
In contrast, the size of the bonus can play an important role under rela-
tional contracting. As is well-known, the key issue in relational contracting
is how large a bonus the agents can trust the principal to pay. The principal
can promise to pay a bonus, but may prefer to renege on his promise once
a problem is solved. He will do so if the size of the bonus is greater than
the expected future beneﬁt of sustaining the productive relationship with
the agents. A larger bonus increases the principal’s immediate gain from
reneging, so that agents may be unwilling to work because of the principal’s
credibility problem.
We show that under relational contracts, the principal will use team in-
centives whenever they are credible but individual incentives are not. This
will be the case when problems are diﬃcult to solve, and the cost of eﬀort
is moderate relative to the project value. The two eﬀects of team incen-
tives both have an impact on the principal’s credibility. Free-riding makes
the principal’s promise of a bonus less credible, because it decreases the ex-
pected proﬁts from continuing the productive relationship. Smoothing bonus
payments over time makes the principal’s promise more credible, because it
decreases his immediate beneﬁt from reneging. When problems are diﬃcult
to solve, the eﬀect of payment smoothing dominates and team incentives will
help with credibility. The principal will then use team incentives if the cost of
eﬀort takes on an intermediate value for which team incentives are credible,
but individual incentives are not.
We then let team size be endogenous, and show how team size relates to
the type of contract and the choice of incentive scheme. Team size is limited
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by the number of agents that the principal can motivate to work, which is
determined by his credibility constraint.
We show that, with formal contracts, the principal can always motivate
more agents under individual incentives than under team incentives. How-
ever, with relational contracts, the principal may be able to motivate more
agents under team incentives. That means the optimal team size is only
higher under team incentives if the ﬁrm uses relational contracts.
Moreover, the principal uses team incentives less often than would be
optimal from a social point of view. For some parameter values, the principal
will use individual incentives even though team incentives would allow him
to motivate more agents. Team incentives are then more eﬃcient, but would
force the principal to give agents strictly positive rents to overcome the free-
rider problem.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 brieﬂy
discusses the relevant literature. Section 3.3 lays out the basic model, and
Section 3.4 analyzes individual and team incentives under formal as well as
relational contracting. Section 3.5 considers the optimal team size, and Sec-
tion 3.6 discusses hybrid individual-team incentives. Section 3.7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
This paper aims to contribute to the burgeoning literature on relational con-
tracts (which we do not attempt to survey here).2 Levin (2003) provides a
deﬁnitive treatment of a repeated agency framework with self-enforcing, rela-
tional contracts, the most distinguishing feature of which is a constraint that
limits the principal’s promise of credible payments. What distinguishes our
work is that we analyze relational team-based incentives in problem-solving
teams. Levitt (1995) is an earlier work that analyzes optimal contracts when
only the agents’ best outcome matters and the principal can choose between
one versus two agents, but it does not consider team incentives.
One of our key ﬁndings is that team incentives can help the principal
2While we abstract from the interaction between formal and relational contracts, the
literature includes such papers as MacLeod and Malcomson (1989), Baker, Gibbons, and
Murphy (1994), Schmidt and Schnitzer (1995), and Pearce and Stacchetti (1998). Recently,
Rayo (2007) considers the joint use of implicit and explicit incentives in teams, where the
focus is on showing that the relational contracts can aﬀect the allocation of proﬁts shares,
giving rise to an endogenously chosen principal.
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by relaxing his credibility constraint. This complements the ﬁndings in the
existing literature. For instance, Auriol, Friebel, and Pechlivanos (2002) ex-
plain why a principal will use more collectively oriented incentives when he
cannot commit to long-term contracts. That is, when workers have career
concerns, the principal uses group compensation to reduce sabotage incen-
tives. Corts (2007) provides yet another reason to use team-based incentives.
He ﬁnds that although individual incentives reduce workers’ exposure to risk,
team incentives are desirable for multi-task problems.
Traditional incentive theories with multiple agents have evolved around
the use of relative performance evaluation, which has the advantage of al-
lowing the principal to ﬁlter out common noise in the workers’ performance
measures (e.g., Holmstrom (1982)). However, a number of authors have also
pointed out that incentive schemes which reward agents when their peers
perform well can sometimes be optimal. For instance, Itoh (1993) shows
that, when agents can side contract on eﬀort, the principal can be better oﬀ
adopting a group incentive scheme. This is despite the fact that one agent’s
output does not contain any information on the other agent’s eﬀort.
Che and Yoo (2001) establish similar results in a repeated game where
agents cannot exchange side payments, but can instead engage in implicit
contracting. Their insight is that under joint performance evaluation, an
agent who shirks can be punished by the subsequent shirking of others agents.
They show that joint performance evaluation can be optimal when the princi-
pal only observes a signal on performance, since peer monitoring then reduces
moral hazard. Speciﬁcally, an agent only receives a bonus if the principal re-
ceives a positive signal both about his work, and about the work of the other
agent. This joint performance evaluation is very diﬀerent than our concept
of team incentives, where a bonus is paid to everyone whenever any agent
solves a problem. The latter has an intuitive interpretation in our setting,
the idea being that everyone receives a bonus whenever the team succeeds.
Another diﬀerence is that Che and Yoo assume there are two agents, and
only consider formal contracting with the principal.
Conceptually, the closest paper to our work is Kvaloy and Olsen (2006).
They modify Che and Yoo by assuming output is non-veriﬁable, and solve
for the optimal relational contract. Just as in our paper, they look at re-
lational contracts in a principal-agent setting, with implicit contracting be-
tween agents. Their main ﬁnding is that when the productivity of eﬀort is
relatively high, credibility problems lead the principal to choose relative per-
formance evaluation. They also show that the optimal contract never pays
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an agent a bonus in a period where his output is low. The principal would
never use what we deﬁne as team incentives, where an agent is paid whenever
the team succeeds, regardless of his own contribution to that success. If the
principal had credibility problems, he would instead use a cleverly designed
relative performance evaluation scheme.
We do not consider the possibility of relative performance evaluation for
a number of reasons. First and foremost, as mentioned above, both indi-
vidual and team incentives are widely used in practice, and we believe it is
instructive to show when one scheme outperforms the other. Moreover, there
are a number of features of relative performance evaluation that can make
it unattractive in practice, by hurting morale and discouraging cooperative
behavior. Relative performance evaluation can encourage agents to sabotage
each other’s work, particularly if they are often in contact with one another.
It can also induce agents to engage in collusive shirking, and distort their
incentives to work with more able colleagues (Gibbons and Murphy 1989)
A common feature of the above two papers is that moral hazard is already
an issue under individual incentives. The principal may therefore want to
use a speciﬁc type of joint performance evaluation to take advantage of peer
monitoring, regardless of whether credibility is an issue. This is in sharp
contrast to our paper, where moral hazard plays no role under individual
incentives. Here, moral hazard only becomes a problem if agents can free-ride
on the work of others, which can occur precisely because the principal uses
team incentives. It is then only partially mitigated by implicit contracting. If
the principal uses team incentives, it is despite their impact on moral hazard,
not because of it.
Our contribution lies in looking at a widely used type of team incentives,
and deriving conditions under which a particular feature, smoothing bonus
payments over time, can be enough to make them preferable to individual
incentives. This will be the case whenever the eﬀect of payment smoothing
outweighs the problem of moral hazard. Focusing on the ranking of these two
incentive regimes also allows us to address the issue of team size. When team
size is endogenous, our work generates novel, testable implications regarding
the relationship between team size, the type of contract, and the choice of
incentive scheme. It also shows that the principal’s choice of incentive scheme
may be ineﬃcient.
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3 The Model
We consider a repeated employment relationship between a principal and a
team of agents hired to solve a series of problems. Problems must be solved
one at a time, in that the team must solve one problem before they begin
work on the next one. The problems can be interpreted as sequential in
nature, as in a team of engineers that builds on previous projects to make
further progress. They can also be interpreted as independent of each other,
as in a team of consultants that deals with one client after another.
Time is discrete, inﬁnite, and indexed by 푡 = 0, 1, . . .. In period 0, the
principal chooses how many agents to employ, 푁 ≥ 0. In period 1, the 푁
agents all go about solving the ﬁrst problem, and they continue working in
subsequent periods until at least one agent solves it. The principal then gives
the agents a second problem to work on in the following period, and so forth.
Following the literature, all parties are risk neutral, and the agents are
subject to limited liability. This means that the principal cannot impose
negative wages on the agents.
In each period, each agent decides whether to work or shirk. If an agent
works, the probability he solves the problem is 푝 > 0. If he shirks, the
probability is zero. An agent who works incurs eﬀort cost 푐 > 0. We assume
that an agent’s probability of solving a problem does not depend on the eﬀort
choice of other agents or the size of the team. This focuses attention on
the role of team-based incentives, rather than production complementarities,
which we believe would reduce tractability without substantially changing
our results.
The principal obtains proﬁts 퐾 > 0 in each period where a problem is
solved, regardless of how many agents solve it.3 An agent’s decision to work or
shirk is observed by all other agents but not by the principal. The principal
can observe, however, whenever an agent solves a problem. We consider
both cases where this information is veriﬁable in court and where it is not.
In the former case, the principals can oﬀer a formal, binding contract. In the
later case, the principal must try to motivate the agents through relational
3In reality, the principal’s proﬁts could depend on the number of agents who solve the
problem, if that corresponds to a “better” solution. The important point is that expected
proﬁts should be concave in the number of agents who exert eﬀort. Our framework is
particularly tractable, as expected proﬁts do not involve binomial probabilities. It allows
us to derive explicit expressions for the values of 푝 for which team incentives can increase
proﬁts.
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contracts. He promises each agent a bonus 푏 to be paid at the end of the
period, conditional on whether a problem was solved in that period. The
promise is non-binding, so the principal can always renege and not pay the
bonus. In our set-up, agents are identical, so the principal oﬀers an identical
contract to all 푁 agents.
Before period 1, the principal chooses between one of two incentive schemes.
Under individual incentives, he promises an agent a bonus each time the agent
solves a problem. Under team incentives, the principal promises all agents a
bonus in each period where a problem is solved, regardless of which one of
them solves it. We assume that contracting between the principal and the
agents is multilateral. An agent considers the principal to have deviated if
the principal reneges on a bonus that any agent was promised. The intuition
is that once the principal breaks any kind of promise, agents regard him as
untrustworthy.
All parties play grim trigger strategies when information is non-veriﬁable.
If the principal reneges on a bonus to an agent, then the productive relation-
ship with all agents ends. The agents shirk in all subsequent periods, and
the principal oﬀers a bonus of zero. Moreover, each agent observes every
other agent’s choice of eﬀort, and engages in implicit contracting with them.
Agents have a work norm which speciﬁes they will impose the worst possible
self-enforcing punishment on an agent who shirks. No side payments are al-
lowed between agents. Optimal relational contracts with risk neutral agents
are stationary (Levin 2003), so we can restrict attention to equilibria where
players’ behavior does not change along the equilibrium path.
Players have a common discount factor 훿 ∈ (0, 1), or equivalently the em-
ployment relationship terminates at the end of each period with probability
1 − 훿. Each agent’s outside option gives a pay-oﬀ of zero, and we assume
that an agent who is indiﬀerent will work. The optimal base salary for the
principal to oﬀer is the lowest salary suﬃcient to induce the agents to join
the ﬁrm, which is zero as long as the agents cannot post bonds. Hence, we
abstract from base wages.
In terms of notation, we use the small scripts 푖 and 푡 to refer to individual
and team incentive schemes, respectively. For example, 푏푖 is the bonus under
individual incentives, while 휋푡 is the expected discounted ﬂow of proﬁts under
team incentives.
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4 Analysis
In this section, we treat team size as exogenous. We are only interested in
cases where it is eﬃcient for all agents to work, rather than shirk:
푁푐 ≤ (1− (1− 푝)푁)퐾. (1)
The left-hand side is the total eﬀort cost when all agents work. It must
be no higher than the right-hand side, which is the project value times the
probability at least one agent solves the problem. The ratio of eﬀort cost to
project value must therefore not be too large.
When output is veriﬁable, the principal’s problem is to minimize the
expected wage payments subject to the constraint that the agents must be
induced to work (e.g., Grossman and Hart (1983)). When output is non-
veriﬁable, there is an additional constraint, as the principal must prefer to
pay the agents the promised bonus rather than renege. That is, relational
incentive contracts must be self-enforcing (Bull 1987).
There are four incentive regimes to consider: formal individual incentives,
formal team incentives, relational individual incentives, and relational team
incentives. We show that under formal contracts, individual incentives are
optimal even though team incentives allow the agents to engage in implicit
contracting. Under relational contracts, individual incentives are also opti-
mal as long as the principal’s credibility constraint is met. If that is not the
case, however, the principal may choose team incentives. In Section 3.6, we
show that these results are robust to considering hybrid incentives, which
include both an individual and team bonus.
4.1 Formal Individual Incentives
Suppose the principal motivates each agent to work by oﬀering individual
incentives. The optimal formal contract in this setting is actually the same
as what would arise with a single agent. The diﬀerences appear later, in
Section 3.5, when the principal chooses team size.
The principal oﬀers a bonus 푏푖 to an agent whenever that agent solves a
problem. That can induce agents to work in each period as a subgame-perfect
Nash equilibrium if
푝푏푖 − 푐 ≥ 0.
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Hence, the principal can motivate each agent to work with:
푏∗푖 =
푐
푝
. (2)
This can be interpreted as an equilibrium spot contract, or as an optimal
long-term contract that the principal can commit to.
4.2 Formal Team Incentives
For given parameter values, the principal’s problem is again to minimize the
cost of motivating the agents. Recall that under team incentives, each agent
gets paid an equal bonus whenever any one of them solves a problem.
With team incentives, an agent’s work generates a positive payoﬀ exter-
nality on the other team members. It now becomes possible to sustain a
subgame-perfect equilibrium with implicit contracting between agents. We
consider the worst possible punishment strategy: if one agent shirks, then
all other agents shirk forever after. An agent who expects others to follow
through on their punishment will work if
1
1− 훿
[
(1− (1− 푝)푁)푏푡 − 푐
] ≥ (1− (1− 푝)푁−1)푏푡.
The left-hand side is the present-discounted expected payoﬀ from working,
given that all other agents work. The right-hand side is the expected payoﬀ
from unilaterally shirking for one period and being subsequently punished by
the teammates’ grim trigger strategy. Rearranging gives the optimal team
bonus, which minimizes the principal’s cost:
푏∗푡 =
푐
훿 − (훿 − 푝)(1− 푝)푁−1 . (3)
We have implicitly assumed an agent will want to shirk in each period
where he is being punished. For this to hold, we must have 푝푏∗푡 < 푐. The
expected bonus from being the only one to work must be less than the cost
of eﬀort, where the inequality is strict because an agent will work when
indiﬀerent. This is the exact same condition for the other agents to want to
follow through on their punishment, and so is suﬃcient for a subgame-perfect
equilibrium. Substituting 푏∗푡 from (3), it is equivalent to
훿 > 푝,
11
which we assume for the rest of the paper. Our ﬁrst result is the following:
Proposition 1. Suppose 푁 ≥ 2 and 훿 > 푝, and the principal uses formal
contracts. The optimal team bonus is lower than the optimal individual
bonus, 푏∗푡 < 푏
∗
푖 . However, the expected per-period payment is larger under
team incentives, so the principal uses individual incentives.
Proof. We require 푝푏∗푡 < 푐, which with 푏
∗
푖 = 푐 implies 푏
∗
푡 < 푏
∗
푖 . For a given
set of parameter values, the principal chooses whichever incentive scheme
induces the agents to work at minimum cost. With the optimal individual
bonus from (2), the principal’s expected per-period payment is
푁푝푏∗푖 = 푁푐,
whereas, with the optimal team bonus from (3), the expected payment is
(1− (1− 푝)푁)푁푏∗푡 =
[
1− (1− 푝)푁
훿 − (훿 − 푝)(1− 푝)푁−1
]
푁푐.
Since 훿 > 푝, the expression in square brackets is strictly greater than 1
for all 푁 ≥ 2. Thus, the expected bonus payment per period is larger under
team incentives than under individual incentives. □
The intuition behind the proposition is as follows. Under team incentives,
the principal can oﬀer a lower bonus and still cover the agents’ cost of eﬀort,
because agents expect to receive a bonus more often. In this way, team
incentives allow the principal to smooth the payment out over many periods.
However, the ﬁrm’s proﬁts depend on its expected payment per period, which
depends on both the size of the bonus and how often it will be paid. Under
team incentives, the increased frequency of payments dominates the smaller
size of the bonus, so that the principal’s expected payment increases. The
culprit here is moral hazard. Team incentives introduce a free-riding problem
which, combined with the principal’s inability to observe eﬀort, constrains
how low the team bonus can be.
It is also straightforward to show that without implicit contracting be-
tween agents, team incentives would give the worst of both worlds. The
principal would not only have to pay a bonus more often than under indi-
vidual incentives, but because of the free-riding problem the bonus would
also have to be larger. As we show below, such a bonus will never lead the
principal to choose team incentives under either form of contracting. Thus,
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employee peer pressure, or a work norm, is critical to the success of a team-
based incentive plan.
4.3 Relational Individual Incentives
The key issue with relational contracts is the principal’s lack of commitment.
He can promise to pay an agent a bonus but then renege once a problem is
solved. Contracting is multilateral, so this would cause all agents to shirk
in future periods. A principal who reneges will therefore do so against all
agents simultaneously.
Formally, this adds the following constraint to the principal’s cost mini-
mization problem:
푁푏푖 ≤ 훿휋푖푁 , (4)
where the left-hand side gives the immediate gain from reneging against
all agents, and the right-hand side gives the loss in future proﬁts. The bonus
must not exceed the average contribution of each agent to the expected value
of the project.
The principal’s present-discounted expected payoﬀ from using individual
incentives to motivate the agents is
휋푖푁 =
1
1− 훿
[
(1− (1− 푝)푁)퐾 −푁푝푏푖
]
, (5)
where the probability that at least one of the 푁 agents solves a problem
in any given period is 1 − (1 − 푝)푁 . Substituting 휋푖푁 into the credibility
constraint (4), gives
푏푖 ≤ 훿(1− (1− 푝)
푁)
1− 훿(1− 푝)
퐾
푁
. (6)
If 푏푖 from (2) satisﬁes this constraint, then the optimal incentive scheme
with relational contracting is the same as that with formal contracting. In
both cases, the principal motivates each agent with an individual bonus.
Otherwise, individual incentives are simply not feasible with relational con-
tracting because any credible bonus payment falls short of the cost of eﬀort.
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4.4 Relational Team Incentives
The analysis continues in a similar way as above, writing out the principal’s
credibility constraint under team incentives
푁푏푡 ≤ 훿휋푡푁 , (7)
The principal’s present-discounted expected payoﬀ from using team in-
centives is
휋푡푁 =
1
1− 훿 (1− (1− 푝)
푁)(퐾 −푁푏푡). (8)
Substituting 휋푡푁 into the credibility constraint (7) and rearranging gives
푏푡 ≤ 훿(1− (1− 푝)
푁)
1− 훿(1− 푝)푁
퐾
푁
. (9)
If the optimal team bonus from (3) satisﬁes this constraint, then it can
also be used with relational contracting. If not, then team incentives are not
feasible with relational contracting because no credible bonus is large enough
to convince agents to work. This may be the case even if the bonus covers
the cost of eﬀort, because each agent is tempted to free-ride on the work of
others
Note that the right-hand side of (9) is strictly less than the right-hand side
of (6). Keeping the size of the bonus ﬁxed, credibility is more of a problem
under team incentives. The principal must share surplus with agents under
team incentives, and therefore loses less if the productive relationship ends.
Under either incentive regime, for all parameter values such that a bonus
is credible, the principal would actually like agents to work. That is, a bonus
can only be credible if 휋 > 0. We can now state the following result.
Proposition 2. Suppose푁 ≥ 2, and the principal uses relational contracts.
Deﬁne the critical value 푝∗ = 훿/(1 + 훿).
Then for 푝 ≥ 푝∗, the principal never uses team incentives. For 푝 < 푝∗, the
principal uses team incentives for intermediate values of 푐/퐾: for any 푝 < 푝∗
there exist values 퐴푝 and 퐵푝, with 0 < 퐴푝 < 퐵푝, such that the principal uses
team incentives if and only if 푐/퐾 ∈ (퐴푝, 퐵푝].
Proof. Substituting 푏∗푖 from (2) into (6) gives the condition for individual
incentives to be credible
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푐퐾
≤
[
훿(1− (1− 푝)푁)푝
1− 훿(1− 푝)
]
1
푁
. (10)
Substituting 푏∗푡 from (3) into (9) gives the condition for team incentives
to be credible
푐
퐾
≤
[
훿(1− (1− 푝)푁) (훿 − (훿 − 푝)(1− 푝)푁−1)
1− 훿(1− 푝)푁
]
1
푁
. (11)
Deﬁne 퐴푝 as the right-hand side of (10), and 퐵푝 as the right-hand side of
(11). Both are strictly positive.
Suppose 푐/퐾 ≤ 퐴푝, so that 푏푖 is credible. Then, from Proposition 1, it fol-
lows that the individual incentive scheme minimizes the principal’s expected
average per-period payment, so the principal uses individual incentives. If
푐/퐾 > 푚푎푥{퐴푝, 퐵푝}, then agents will not work under either incentive regime,
even though working is eﬃcient when 푐/퐾−푚푎푥{퐴푝, 퐵푝} is suﬃciently close
to zero.
The only occasion where the principal uses team incentives is when 푐/퐾 ∈
(퐴푝, 퐵푝], so when 푏푡 is credible but 푏푖 is not. It remains to show that 퐵푝 > 퐴푝
if and only if 푝 < 훿/(1 + 훿).
Cross multiplying and canceling terms shows 퐵푝 − 퐴푝 > 0 is equivalent
to
(1− 훿(1− 푝))(훿 − (훿 − 푝)(1− 푝)푁−1)− 푝(1− 훿(1− 푝)푁) > 0
Rearranging gives
훿 − 푝(1 + 훿)− (1− 푝)푁−1(훿 − 푝(1 + 훿)) > 0
(훿 − 푝(1 + 훿))[1− (1− 푝)푁−1] > 0
Since 푁 ≥ 2, this inequality holds if and only if 푝 < 훿/(1 + 훿). □
The proposition says that the principal will use team incentives for prob-
lems that are diﬃcult to solve, if the cost of eﬀort is moderate relative to the
project value. For any 푝 < 훿/(1 + 훿), team incentives soften the principal’s
credibility constraint, whereas for all larger values of 푝 they actually make
his credibility problem worse.
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One might wonder why team incentives don’t unambiguously help with
credibility, at least for all 푝 < 훿. After all, team incentives smooth payment
out over many periods, and when 푝 < 훿 this gives rise to a smaller bonus. A
smaller bonus, in turn, reduces the principal’s incentive to renege.
The reason is that the size of the bonus is only one part of the credibility
constraint. From (6) and (9), what matters is how this bonus compares to
an agent’s average contribution to expected proﬁts. Under team incentives,
the principal has to deal with moral hazard. He must give each agent strictly
positive surplus to motivate him to work rather than free-ride on the work of
others. Each agent’s contribution to expected proﬁts is therefore lower than
under individual incentives, which is why the right-hand side of (9) is strictly
less than the right-hand side of (6).
Whether team incentives help with credibility depends on which of the
two eﬀects dominates, payment smoothing or moral hazard. Here, the value
of 푝 is of particular importance. When problems are diﬃcult to solve, the
payment smoothing eﬀect is strong and team incentives help with credibility.
If 푝 < 훿/(1 + 훿), then there are values of 푐/퐾 for which team incen-
tives are credible but individual incentives are not. The proposition shows
that these are intermediate values of 푐/퐾. If 푐/퐾 is small, then individual
incentives are optimal because relational contracts do not impose a bind-
ing constraint. Credibility is not an issue, since the beneﬁt of honoring the
relational contracts dominates the short-term gain from defection. The prin-
cipal can credibly oﬀer 푏∗푖 and capture all surplus. If 푐/퐾 is large, then the
principal cannot motivate agents under either incentive regime. No bonus is
credible, even for some values of 푐/퐾 for which working is eﬃcient. The prin-
cipal therefore uses team incentives if the cost of eﬀort is moderate relative
to the project value.
The critical value 푝∗ = 훿/(1+훿) is increasing in 훿. More patience increases
the range of 푝 for which team incentives can be proﬁtable, to include some
problems that are easier to solve. This is the case even though increased
patience relaxes the principal’s credibility constraint under individual incen-
tives, and team incentives can only be useful when that constraint is violated.
The intuition is that an increase in 훿 has a direct eﬀect under both in-
centive regimes, since a principal who is patient is less tempted to renege,
but also has an added indirect eﬀect under team incentives. When agents
are patient, they are less inclined to shirk because they want to avoid the
punishment from the grim trigger strategy. Moral hazard is less of a problem,
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which increases proﬁts and helps again with credibility.4
The following graph illustrates the result for particular values of 푁 and
훿.
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The graph plots 푐/퐾, the ratio of eﬀort cost to project value, versus 푝, the
probability of solving a problem. The principal can earn positive proﬁts with
formal contracts in the region below the solid curve. Since formal contracts
allow the principal to capture all surplus, this is also the region where it is
eﬃcient for agents to work.
The optimal team bonus is credible in the region below the curve rep-
resented with larger dashes, while the optimal individual bonus is credible
in the region below the curve represented with smaller dots. The parameter
values lying below the solid curve but above both the dotted and dashed
curves are those where work is eﬃcient, but the principal cannot motivate
agents because of a lack of credibility.
The principal will use team incentives for parameter values such that a
team bonus is credible, but an individual bonus is not. In the graph, this is
4An increase in 훿 does not unambiguously make team incentives more attractive. The
range of 푝 for which team incentives can be proﬁtable does increase. However, for a given
푝, the range of 푐/퐾 for which team incentive are proﬁtable may decrease. For example,
for any 푝, 퐵푝 −퐴푝 tends to zero as 훿 tends to 1.
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the region above the dotted and below the dashed curve. For team incentives
to be proﬁtable, 푝 should be less than 7/17, and then 푐/퐾 should take on an
intermediate value.
5 Optimal Team Size
The previous section considered individual and team incentives when team
size was exogenous, so that the basic mechanism at work could be clearly
shown. In this section, we endogenize team size by letting the principal
choose 푁 , the number of agents to employ at the beginning of the game.
The reason for this exercise is twofold. First, with this added dimension,
one might arrive at a diﬀerent conclusion regarding the ranking of team
versus individual incentives. Second, this approach also generates testable
predictions regarding the relationship between team size and the type of
compensation scheme, which, so far, seems to have been neglected in the
literature.
As in the previous section, we look at two situations: where information
is veriﬁable so the principal can use formal contracts, and where it is non-
veriﬁable so he must use relational contracts. In each situation, for given
parameter values, we are interested in whether the principal prefers to use
individual or team incentives.
The principal’s problem is not to pick his preferred value of 푁 , and choose
the incentive regime under which it can be implemented. That is because,
quite apart from credibility issues, the proﬁt maximizing team size will de-
pend on the incentive regime being used. Team incentives force the principal
to share surplus, which aﬀects his incentive to hire more agents. Beyond this
issue, credibility will again play a key role. An important factor for the prin-
cipal will be which incentive regime allows him to motivate a greater number
of agents.
Suppose that information about output is veriﬁable so the principal can
use formal contracts, and say the principal uses individual incentives. The
principal will choose a value of 푁 such that,
휋푖푁 − 휋푖푁−1 ≥ 0. (12)
Substituting 휋푖푁 from (5) into (12) and evaluating it at 푏
∗
푖 yields,
푝(1− 푝)푁−1퐾 ≥ 푐, (13)
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The marginal agent’s contribution to project value is positive when he
is the only agent to solve a problem, the probability of which is monotone
decreasing in 푁 . On the other hand, the expected bonus payment per agent
is constant at 푐. Therefore, the principal maximizes expected proﬁts by
choosing the largest integer 푁 such that (13) is satisﬁed.
To be more precise, deﬁne 푁1 ∈ ℝ as the largest value of 푁 such that
휋푖푁 − 휋푖푁−1 = 0. Then, the optimal number of agents to employ, 푁∗1 , is the
largest integer less than or equal to 푁1, that is 푁
∗
1 = ⌊푁1⌋
Now suppose information about output is non-veriﬁable, so the principal
must use relational contracts. We showed in the previous section that for any
given 푁 , the optimal individual bonus is the same as with formal contracts:
푏∗푖 = 푐/푝. Any lower bonus would fail to cover the cost of eﬀort.
The problem is this bonus may not be credible for 푁 = 푁∗1 . To mo-
tivate the agents, the principal must satisfy the credibility constraint (6).
Substituting 푏∗푖 and rearranging gives
(1− (1− 푝)푁)퐾
푁
≥
(
1− 훿(1− 푝)
훿푝
)
푐, (14)
Each side of this inequality is strictly greater than the corresponding
side in (13), because there are two competing forces at work. For a bonus
to be credible, an agent’s contribution to expected future proﬁts has to be
bounded away from zero. For hiring an additional agent to be proﬁtable,
that agent’s contribution just has to be positive. This suggests the credibil-
ity constraint should be violated at 푁1. On the other hand, for credibility, it
is an agent’s average contribution to expected proﬁts which matters, while
for hiring a new agent it is the marginal contribution. The average contri-
bution is strictly higher than the marginal contribution, which suggests the
credibility constraint should be satisﬁed at 푁1. The net impact of these two
eﬀects determines whether a bonus is credible at the unconstrained optimum.
The left-hand side of (14) is decreasing in 푁 and the right-hand side is
constant, so the credibility constraint is violated when 푁 exceeds a given
threshold. Deﬁne 푁2 ∈ ℝ as the value of 푁 such that (14) holds with
equality, and let ⌊푁2⌋ be the largest integer less than or equal to 푁2. Then
the optimal number of agents to employ, 푁∗2 , is the minimum of 푁
∗
1 and
⌊푁2⌋. Team size is therefore weakly smaller than under formal contracts.
The analysis for team incentives proceeds in a similar fashion. However,
it is not necessarily true that proﬁts 휋푡푁 are concave in 푁 , or that credibility
becomes a bigger problem for large values of 푁 .
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Suppose team output is veriﬁable, so the principal can use formal con-
tracts. Using (8) and (3), his optimal choice of 푁 will maximize
휋푡푁 =
1
1− 훿 (1− (1− 푝)
푁)(퐾 − 푁푐
훿 − (훿 − 푝)(1− 푝)푁−1 ) (15)
It will be an integer such that the following inequality holds for 푁 = 푁 ′
but not for 푁 = 푁 ′ + 1,
휋푡푁 − 휋푡푁−1 ≥ 0. (16)
Note that if 휋푡푁 is quasi-concave in 푁 , which we suspect is the case, it
will be the largest value of 푁 such that (16) holds. That is equivalent to
푝(1−푝)푁−1퐾 ≥
([
1− (1− 푝)푁
훿 − (훿 − 푝)(1− 푝)푁−1
]
푁 −
[
1− (1− 푝)푁−1
훿 − (훿 − 푝)(1− 푝)푁−2
]
(푁 − 1)
)
푐.
(17)
The marginal beneﬁt from hiring an additional agent is decreasing in 푁 ,
just as it was under individual incentives. The marginal cost is the change
in the expected total bonus payment, which is given by the right-hand side.
The reason proﬁts may not be concave is that this change is not always
increasing in 푁 . This is because moral hazard becomes a larger problem
when 푁 increases, but at a decreasing rate.
That being said, we show below that the change in the expected total
bonus payment is strictly greater than 푐 for all 푁 ≥ 2. Comparing (17) to
(13), it therefore follows that with formal contracting, the optimal team size
is weakly smaller under team incentives than under individual incentives.
Deﬁne 푁3 ∈ ℝ as the value of 푁 that maximizes 휋푡푁 , for which (17) holds
with equality. Then, the optimal number of agents to employ is 푁∗3 = ⌊푁3⌋.
Finally, consider the case where information is non-veriﬁable, and the
principal uses relational team incentives. For the promised bonus to be cred-
ible, it must satisfy the credibility constraint (9). Substituting 푏∗푡 and rear-
ranging gives
(1− (1− 푝)푁)퐾
푁
≥
[ 1
훿
− (1− 푝)푁
훿 − (훿 − 푝)(1− 푝)푁−1
]
푐, (18)
Just as with individual incentives, whether or not the constraint is vio-
lated at the unconstrained optimum, 푁∗3 , will depend on parameter values.
20
The left-hand side of (18) is decreasing in 푁 , while the right-hand side
can be either increasing or decreasing in 푁 . Hence, in contrast to individual
incentives, an increase in 푁 does not necessarily make the credibility con-
straint harder to satisfy. One way to understand this is that the average
contribution of each team member to expected proﬁts is decreasing with 푁 ,
but so is the size of the team bonus. The principal can promise each member
of a large team a lower bonus, because team members expect to receive the
bonus more often. The ﬁrst eﬀect hurts credibility, but the second eﬀect
helps. For some parameter values, a team bonus may not be credible for low
or high values of 푁 , but credible for values in between.
At ﬁrst glance, this seems to suggest that, under team incentives, rela-
tional contracts can actually increase team size compared to formal contracts.
That would be the case if all 푁 ≤ 푁∗3 violate the credibility constraint, but
some 푁 > 푁∗3 does not and gives strictly positive proﬁts. However, we
have looked extensively at numerical examples, and so far have no evidence
that this actually occurs. At least in these examples, relational contracting
decreases team size. Whether this is always the case remains to be seen.
Deﬁne 푁∗4 as the integer which maximizes 휋
푡
푁 subject to (18). We then
have the following result.
Proposition 3. Suppose 푁 ≥ 2 and 훿 > 푝.
(i) Under individual incentives, the optimal team size is weakly smaller
with relational contracting than with formal contracting: 푁∗2 ≤ 푁∗1
(ii) With formal contracting, the optimal team size is weakly smaller with
team incentives than with individual incentives, 푁∗3 ≤ 푁∗1 , and the principal
uses individual incentives.
(iii) With relational contracting, the optimal team size can be either
smaller or larger with team incentives than with individual incentives. The
principal only uses team incentives if the optimal team size is strictly larger,
푁∗4 > 푁
∗
2 , but the converse is not true.
Proof.
(i) 푁∗2 ≤ 푁∗1 follows immediately from the fact that relational contracts
just impose the constraint (14) on the principal’s problem, which is satisﬁed
if and only if 푁 is below some threshold value.
(ii) To show 푁∗3 ≤ 푁∗1 , it is suﬃcient to show that the right-hand side of
(17) is greater than 푐. That will imply that (17) is violated for all 푁 ≥ 푁1.
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It is enough that the following expression be greater than 1 and increasing
in 푁 .
1− (1− 푝)푁
훿 − (훿 − 푝)(1− 푝)푁−1 (19)
It is greater than 1 because 훿 > 푝. Taking the diﬀerence of (19) evaluated
at 푁 = 푁 ′ and at 푁 = 푁 ′ − 1, relabeling 푁 ′ = 푁 and simplifying yields
(1− 훿)푝2(1− 푝)푁−2
[훿 − (훿 − 푝)(1− 푝)푁−1] [훿 − (훿 − 푝)(1− 푝)푁−2]
This is strictly positive for 푁 ≥ 2, so (19) is increasing in 푁 .
To show that the principal uses individual incentives, note that the prin-
cipal’s expected proﬁts with individual incentives for given 푁 is (5) evaluated
at (2):
휋푖(푁) =
1
1− 훿
[
(1− (1− 푝)푁)퐾 −푁푐] .
The principal’s expected proﬁts with team incentives is given by (15):
휋푡(푁) =
1
1− 훿
{
(1− (1− 푝)푁)퐾 −
[
1− (1− 푝)푁
훿 − (훿 − 푝)(1− 푝)푁−1
]
푁푐
}
.
The term in square brackets is strictly greater than 1 for 푁 ≥ 2, so
휋푖(푁) > 휋푡(푁). That implies proﬁts are higher under individual incentives
if 푁∗1 = 푁
∗
3 . Now say instead 푁
∗
3 < 푁
∗
1 . The optimal choice of 푁 under
individual incentives was 푁∗1 , so we have 휋
푖(푁∗1 ) > 휋
푖(푁∗3 ). Combined with
휋푖(푁∗3 ) > 휋
푡(푁∗3 ), this implies 휋
푖(푁∗1 ) > 휋
푡(푁∗3 ).
(iii) We illustrate that 푁∗4 can be either smaller or larger than 푁
∗
2 by
example. Let 푐/퐾 = 1/30, 훿 = 0.9 and 푝 = 0.2. The largest integer satis-
fying (13) and (14) is 푁∗2 = 9, while maximizing (15) subject to (18) yields
푁∗4 = 8. In this case, neither credibility constraint binds. Carrying out the
same exercise for 훿 = 0.6 gives 푁∗2 = 4 and 푁
∗
4 = 6, where the credibility
constraint only binds under individual incentives. Moreover, in this last case,
plugging into expected proﬁts gives 휋푖 = 1.143 and 휋푡 = 1.058. So there are
parameters for which 푁∗4 > 푁
∗
2 but 휋
푖 > 휋푡.
To show that the principal uses individual incentives for all 푁∗4 ≤ 푁∗2 ,
the proof follows similar lines to that in (ii). Proﬁts are clearly higher under
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individual incentives if 푁∗2 = 푁
∗
4 . If 푁
∗
4 < 푁
∗
2 , then 휋
푖(푁∗2 ) > 휋
푖(푁∗4 ) because
푁∗2 was the optimal choice under individual incentives. That means 푁
∗
2 must
have been credible. A choice of 푁 is credible under individual incentives if
and only if it is below a threshold value, so 푁∗4 < 푁
∗
2 must be credible as
well. That implies 휋푖(푁∗4 ) > 휋
푡(푁∗4 ), which yields 휋
푖(푁∗2 ) > 휋
푡(푁∗4 ). □
The intuition behind the proposition is as follows. That relational con-
tracting (weakly) decreases the optimal team size under individual incentives
is not so surprising. Relational contracting only adds an additional constraint
to a well-deﬁned problem, and each agent’s contribution to team output is
decreasing in team size. For instance, if 푁∗2 = 푁
∗
1 , then the credibility con-
straint does not bind, and proﬁts are the same as under veriﬁable information.
If 푁∗2 < 푁
∗
1 , then hiring an extra agent would increase expected proﬁts, but
by too little to make the principal’s promise of a bonus credible. Because of
this, proﬁts under relational contracts are lower.
The second result is that with formal contracts, team incentives call for a
(weakly) smaller team size than individual incentives do. When the principal
hires a new agent, he has to give the new agent strictly positive surplus, and
he also has to increase the surplus given to all other agents. This makes
hiring extra agents unattractive, and in fact causes the principal to prefer
individual incentives. For certain projects, however, individual incentives
may be infeasible because the principal cannot observe individual output, in
which case he would be constrained to oﬀer team incentives. The result says
that in such a case, the optimal team size with team incentives will be lower
than it would be under individual incentives.
The last result tells us that with relational contracts, the principal may
be better oﬀ choosing team incentives rather than individual incentives. In
the previous section, this was because individual bonuses were not credible,
and team incentives were required for agents to work at all. Here team
incentives can allow the principal to motivate a larger number of agents. This
can increase the principal’s expected proﬁts, particularly when the problems
are diﬃcult to solve. So if the principal chooses to use team incentives, the
optimal team size will be higher than it would be under individual incentives.
To summarize, under formal contracting, team incentives will be used
in small teams, and only because information on individual output is not
observable. Under relational contracting, team incentives will be used in
large teams, and it will be because they soften the principal’s credibility
constraint.
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Letting team size be endogenous also allows us to say something about
eﬃciency. The principal captures all surplus under individual incentives, but
under team incentives he must give agents strictly positive rents. Agents need
these rents to be willing to work despite the free-riding problem. That implies
whenever the principal uses team incentives, they must be more eﬃcient than
individual incentives. Team incentives can be more eﬃcient if they soften the
principal’s credibility problem and allow him to motivate more agents.
In contrast, the simulations below show many parameter values where
team incentives are more eﬃcient but the principal still uses individual in-
centives. The principal chooses team incentives over individual incentives
less often than what would be optimal from a social perspective, because
they do not allow him to appropriate all surplus.5 We therefore have the
following result.
Proposition 4. For any parameter values such that the principal uses
team incentives, total surplus is higher than it would be under individual
incentives. However, there exist parameter values such that the principal
uses individual incentives, but total surplus would be higher under team
incentives.
Proof. If the principal uses team incentives, then by Proposition 3 he must
be using relational contracts. Total surplus under individual incentives is
휋푖(푁
∗
2 ), plus the expected payment to agents, minus 푁푐. By (2), each agent’s
expected payment under individual incentives is just 푐, so total surplus equals
휋푖(푁
∗
2 ).
Similarly, total surplus under team incentives is 휋푡(푁
∗
4 ), plus the expected
payment to agents, minus 푁푐. By (3), each agent’s expected payment is[
1− (1− 푝)푁
훿 − (훿 − 푝)(1− 푝)푁−1
]
푐
which, by 훿 > 푝, is strictly greater than 푐 for all 푁 ≥ 2. Total surplus is
therefore strictly greater than 휋푡(푁
∗
4 ). The fact that the principal uses team
5In the simulations, the team incentives are more eﬃcient than individual incentives
if and only if they allow the principal to motivate more agents. To establish this as a
general result, it would be suﬃcient that 푁∗4 < 푁
∗
3 , so that credibility problems cannot
cause teams to be ineﬃciently large under team incentives. This appears to be the case,
but it is not immediately clear since (18) can be non-monotonic in 푁 .
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incentives implies 휋푡(푁
∗
4 ) ≥ 휋푖(푁∗2 ), so team incentives must give strictly
higher total surplus.
The second part of the proposition follows from the numerical simulations
below. □
We now use simulations to gain more insight into when the principal uses
team incentives, and when he uses individual incentives even though they
are ineﬃcient. The parameters 푝 and 훿 both lie between 0 and 1, while 푁
is endogenous, and 푐 and 퐾 only matter through the ratio 푐/퐾. We ﬁx the
value of 푐/퐾, and divide (푝, 훿)-space into a grid of 200 by 50. For each vertex
of the grid, we determine how many agents the principal would hire under
individual and team incentives, and which regime gives the highest proﬁts.
We represent the results graphically, and vary 푐/퐾 to show how they
change. The lighter circles show where the principal uses team incentives,
while the darker squares show where he uses individual incentives even though
they are ineﬃcient. By the ﬁrst part of Proposition 4, these two regions give
the parameter values for which team incentives are eﬃcient. The solid curve
gives the principal’s credibility constraint when 푁 = 1.
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The results show that the principal uses team incentives in a region
around the solid curve. This is not surprising, since this is the region where
credibility is a problem.
The principal tends to use team incentives when p is relatively low, and
then for intermediate values of 훿. If 푝 is high, then an individual bonus
will likely be paid in most periods, and team incentives do little to smooth
payments over time. In particular, we know from Proposition 2 that the
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principal will never use team incentives for 푝 ≥ 훿/(1 + 훿), because then they
cannot help with credibility for any 푁 .
If both 푝 and 훿 are low, the principal cannot motivate any agents because
a bonus is not credible under either incentive regime. As 훿 increases, team
incentives become credible and the principal can motivate agents to work.
This is the case both for some parameter values below the solid curve, where
individual incentives are not credible, and for some parameter values above
the solid curve, where individual incentives are credible but team incentives
allow the principal to motivate more agents.
As 훿 increases still more, credibility becomes less of a problem and the
principal switches to individual incentives, because they allow him to capture
all surplus. The graphs suggest he switches at a value of 훿 where team
incentives are still eﬃcient.
The graphs illustrate how, in contrast to individual incentives, the credi-
bility constraint under team incentives can actually become easier to satisfy
as 푁 increases. When 푁 = 1, an individual bonus is equivalent to a team
bonus. The principal cannot motivate a single agent to work in the region
below the solid curve, because the promised bonus is not credible. However,
the principal is able to motivate at least 푁 ≥ 2 agents with team incentives at
each point where there is a light blue circle, some of which lie below the solid
curve. By helping with credibility, team incentives expand the parameter
space for which the principal can proﬁtably motivate agents.
As 푐/퐾 decreases, credibility is less of a concern and the region where
team incentives are eﬃcient shifts towards the south-west corner of (푝, 훿)-
space. Team incentives can now motivate agents at points where they previ-
ously were not credible. At the same time, there are other points where the
principal now uses individual rather than team incentives because credibility
is no longer an issue.
6 Hybrid Incentives
The assumption that the principal can choose either individual or team incen-
tives may appear restrictive, because in the real world, organizations some-
times reward employees both for individual and team performance. There
may exist a pay diﬀerential between performers and non-performers within
teams, but the ﬁrm also rewards all team members if the group achieves a
certain goal.
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In this section, we consider a hybrid incentive scheme, in which the prin-
cipal can use both an individual and team bonus. In line with the previous
sections, we do not consider the optimal contract, but rather all combinations
of individual and team-based incentives.
To further simplify the analysis, we treat 푁 here as exogenous. Our
purpose is to investigate whether simultaneous use of individual and team
incentives would eliminate the need for team incentives, and whether ef-
ﬁciency can be further increased by combining the two incentive schemes.
The answer to the second question is a fairly straightforward yes because
this is merely a relaxed program for the principal. The answer to the ﬁrst
question is no, which means that our results on team incentives are in fact
robust to this extension.
Suppose that the principal promises to pay an individual bonus 푏푖 to any
agent who solves a problem, and at the same time he promises to pay each
team member a bonus 푏푡 whenever any one of the agents solves a problem.
Then, the principal’s problem is to choose 푏푖 and 푏푡, which minimize the total
costs necessary to induce the agents to work,
min
푏푖,푏푡
(1− (1− 푝)푁)푁푏푡 +푁푝푏푖,
subject to the agents’ incentive constraints:
1
1− 훿
[
푝푏푖 + (1− (1− 푝)푁)푏푡 − 푐
] ≥ (1− (1− 푝)푁−1)푏푡.
This incentive constraint reduces to
푝푏푖 ≥
[
(1− 푝)푁−1(훿 − 푝)− 훿] 푏푡 + 푐, (20)
These work incentives are illustrated below in Figure 1 as a solid line.
Figure 1
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The slope of this constraint is
−훿 − (1− 푝)
푁−1(훿 − 푝)
푝
,
whereas the slope of any iso-cost line is
−1− (1− 푝)
푁
푝
.
Thus, the iso-cost lines are steeper than the agents’ work incentive con-
straint as long as 푁 ≥ 2. It then follows that the optimal formal contract is
to use only individual incentives, which is in line with the previous ﬁndings.
On the other hand, relational contracts impose the following credibility
constraint:
푁(푏푡 + 푏푖) ≤ 훿
1− 훿 [(1− (1− 푝)
푁)(퐾 −푁푏푡)−푁푝푏푖] (21)
The principal’s maximum gain from reneging is 푁(푏푡 + 푏푖), which is the
total bonus payment if all agents solve the problem in a period. This must
be less than or equal to the lost value from discontinuing the productive
relationship.
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This constraint is illustrated in Figure 1 as a dotted line. In fact, Figure
1 illustrates a case where the principal chooses an incentive scheme involving
a team-based bonus, and the shaded area represents the set of bonus pairs
that satisfy both the agents’ work incentive and the principal’s credibility
constraint. Since the iso-cost lines are steeper than these lines, the principal’s
optimal choice is at the intersection of the two constraints. In general, what
matters is the relative position of the two constraints, which determines which
incentive scheme the principal will choose under relational contracting.
Proposition 5. Suppose 푁 ≥ 2 and 훿 > 푝, and the principal can use
hybrid incentives. (i) Under formal contracting, the principal uses individual
incentives. (ii) Under relational contracting, the principal uses hybrid incen-
tives that involve a team bonus if and only if he would have chosen pure team
incentives had there been no possibility of a mixture. Both individual and
team bonuses are smaller under optimal hybrid incentives than when they
are used separately, and the principal earns higher proﬁts.
Proof. (i) The proof follows directly from the text. (ii) It suﬃces to
show that the condition under which the principal chooses hybrid incentives
involving a team bonus is the same as when he would choose team incentives
from Proposition 2. It can be veriﬁed that the 푥- and 푦-intercepts of the
agents’ work incentive constraint (20) are just 푏∗푡 and 푏
∗
푖 from (2) and (3).
Say (6) holds so the principal would choose individual incentives over
team incentives. He will also choose only individual incentives now if the
푦-intercept of the credibility constraint (21) is higher than 푏∗푖 . That is just
푏∗푖 ≤
훿(1− (1− 푝)푁)
1− 훿(1− 푝)
퐾
푁
, (22)
which is the same condition as (6).
Now say (6) is violated but (9) is satisﬁed, so the principal would choose
team incentives over individual incentives. The 푥-intercept of the credibility
constraint (21) is higher than 푏∗푡 if
푏∗푡 ≤
훿(1− (1− 푝푁))
1− 훿(1− 푝)푁
퐾
푁
, (23)
which is the same condition as (9). Given (i) and the fact that the
slopes are all negative, it follows that the principal will use a team bonus
as part of a hybrid incentive scheme as in Figure 1. The optimum lies at the
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intersection of the two constraints, and the bonuses are smaller than the 푥-
and 푦-intercepts. The boundary case occurs when condition (22) is violated
but (23) is satisﬁed with equality, so the principal uses only the optimal team
bonus, 푏∗푡 . □
The proposition says that under exactly the same conditions as when the
principal chose team incentives in Section 3.4, team incentives are now used
as part of a hybrid incentive scheme. They are used alongside individual
incentives, except for the boundary case. This means that our previous ﬁnd-
ings do not change substantially when we allow the principal to combine both
incentive schemes. The only diﬀerence is that now the principal’s expected
cost is lower than before.
As mentioned above, a hybrid incentive scheme seems more consistent
with the observation that incentive pay may depend on more than one per-
formance measure, so on both individual and team performance. That is,
all workers receive a bonus when the team’s project succeeds, but those who
have made a large contribution receive more than others. The key is again
that the group bonus is used to reduce the principal’s commitment problem.
7 Conclusion
This paper provides a rationale for using group incentive schemes, such as
a divisional bonus, even if individual output is observable. When individ-
ual incentives are not credible, the principal may still be able to motivate
employees by rewarding them based on group outcomes.
We set our argument in the context of problem-solving organizations,
providing a particularly tractable model where we can endogenize team size.
We show that team-based incentives are sometimes used under relational con-
tracting, even when the production technologies are independent and agents
are risk neutral.
The key point is that agents may be willing to work for a lower bonus when
they are rewarded each time a team member solves a problem, rather than
only when they solve a problem themselves. Agents then expect to receive
a bonus more often, so the principal can smooth payments out over time.
Team incentives also create a free-riding problem, but it can be mitigated by
implicit contracting if agents are suﬃciently patient.
If information about output is non-veriﬁable, then smoothing bonus pay-
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ments via team incentives is good for credibility. The principal is less tempted
to renege on smaller, more frequent, bonuses, and this eﬀect becomes stronger
when problems are diﬃcult to solve.
Under formal contracting, in our set-up, the principal always prefers to
use individual incentives. The principal would only use team incentives if he
did not observe individual output, in which case team incentives would lead
him to reduce team size. Under relational contracting, however, the principal
will use team incentives when problems are diﬃcult to solve, and the eﬀort
cost is moderate relative to the project value. In this case, team incentives
allow the principal to motivate more agents and increase team size.
We also show that, from a social point of view, the principal chooses
team incentives over individual incentives less often than would be eﬃcient.
Team incentives can be more eﬃcient if they allow the principal to motivate a
greater number of agents. In some such situations, however, the principal still
prefers individual incentives because they allow him to capture all surplus.
As more and more people solve problems rather than manufacture goods,
we believe team-based incentive schemes may be increasingly important for
knowledge workers and organizations that employ them. We already observe
that in many cases, team members share both monetary and reputation
rewards based on the outcome of the whole project. Our results suggest
that when credibility is an issue and problems are diﬃcult to solve, team
incentives can play a particularly important role.
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